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2The Complaint: 
Fed/DOD Acquisition System Under Siege by 
Unfair, Frivolous, Costly, Dilatory Protests
3The Research Question: Are Federal Procurement 
Agencies Using Every Tool In the Legal Toolbox to 
Reduce Costs and Delays from Bid Protests? 
4In Other Words, Who’s Got the Blinds On 
in the Bid Protest Process? 
5The NPS Bid Protest Study
• Stood up with funding form the Office of Assistant Secretary of 
the Air Force for Acquisition and NPS Acquisition Research 
Program
• Includes Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI) and 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP)
• Multi-disciplinary perspective (students, faculty, procurement 
law, engineering, economics, management, contracting)
• Study Output Includes: 
– Analytical Papers; 
– Literature Reviews; 
– Guidance Charts on Most Effective Prevention and Resolution Strategies;
– Survey of Top Legal and Acquisition Professionals in Civilian and Defense 
Agencies
6The Legal Toolbox
for Bid Protest 
Prevention & Resolution:
• Pre-Protest: Pro-Competition Acquisition Strategies, 
Thorough Debriefings
• Protests at the Agency Level
• Protests at the GAO: Mandatory Stay Overrides; 
Bridge Contracts; Motions to Dismiss as 
Frivolous/Meritless, Early Corrective Action, ADR, 
Express Option Requests; Declaratory Relief, Protest 
Costs, Refusal to Exercise Options 
• Protests at the COFC: Motions to Dismiss, 
Opposition to TRO/PI/Perm I; Bonds; Judgment on 
Administrative Record; National Security 
Considerations Statute; ADR; Rule 11 Sanctions
7ADR: The Requirements
• The Competition in Contracting Act ,31 U.S.C. § 3554 (a)(1) 
required the GAO to provide “for the inexpensive and 
expeditious resolution of protests.”
• Executive Order No. 12979 (1995) mandates that agencies “to 
the maximum extent practicable, provide for inexpensive, 
informal, procedurally simple, and expeditious resolution of 
protests, including, where appropriate and as permitted by law, 
the use of alternative resolution techniques.”
• E.O. also states that these measures were intended “to ensure 
effective and efficient expenditure of public funds and fair and
expeditious resolution of protests to the award of Federal 
procurement contracts.”
• Federal Acquisition Regulation incorporates the tenets of CICA 
and E.O. 12979 in Subpart 33.1, Protests (including agency-
level protests).  
8Common Objections to ADR and Other 
Prevention/Resolution Strategies and 
Flexibilities
• Mandatory Stay overrides are difficult to obtain
• All Potential Offerors Must Concur on ADR
• Source Selection/Protected Information Required for 
ADR
• Agency Would Like to Obtain Definitive Outside Seal 
of Approval for its Acquisition from the GAO  
• Agencies Must Follow GAO Recommendations Due 
to Likely Congressional Sanctions
– Sources: Construction Law Handbook, 
Congressional Research Service, Schaengold, et 
al. “Protest Choice of Forum”
9Responses to Common Objections on Use 
of ADR and Other Prevention/Resolution 
Strategies and Flexibilities
• Mandatory Stay overrides are difficult to obtain
• A: Court of Federal Claims statute, 28 U.S.C. 1491, 
requires due regard for interests of national defense 
and national security.  2010 CRS Report No.R40228 
shows this statute does not guarantee vistory for 
DOD, but often helps avoid interruptions for defense 
procurements
• All Potential Offerors Must Concur on ADR
• A: Pre-award, choose the most pro-competitive 
acquisition strategy that meets gov’t needs.  Post-
award, only offerors with standing (direct economic 
interest and substantial chance of award) matter
10
Responses to Common Objections on Use of 
ADR and Other Prevention/Resolution 
Strategies and Flexibilities
• Agency Would Like to Obtain Definitive Outside Seal of 
Approval for its Acquisition from the GAO  
• A: GAO decisions are legally non-binding on anyone
• A: GAO review focuses on better procedure, not legal procedure
• A: Agency leaders must be confident in their decisions and 
agency needs.  COFC will hold agencies in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act for following wrong GAO opinions!
See Geo-Seis Helicopters v. United States (2007) and Grunley 
Walsh International, LLC v. United States (2007)
• A: GAO decision is time-consuming (up to 100 days mandatory 
stay without override to wait for decision)
• A: GAO decision is costly in agency time and $$$$ fees (can 
award protester legal fees of $750 per hour, e.g. Public 
Communications Services, Inc. – Costs, B-400058.4 (2009)).  In 
the Boeing tanker protest, legal fees about $1 million estimated.
11
Responses to Common Objections on Use 
of ADR and Other Prevention/Resolution 
Strategies and Flexibilities
• Agencies Must Follow GAO Recommendations Due to Likely 
Congressional Sanctions
• A: GAO/CRS data since 1995 shows no sanctions against DOD 
• In FY 1995-2009, only 2 civilian and 4 military procurements 
where agency declined to follow GAO
• All procurements were relatively low-dollar service contracts 
(base logistics, base/plant operations, IT, competitive sourcing)
• Interestingly, no record of DOD refusing to follow in protests 
involving warfighter equipment or MDAPs
• CRS No. R40228 reports only one threatened Congressional 
sanction (against Office of Personnel Management); in one 
other case, Army was supported by Congressional leaders, 
OMB/OFPP, and DOJ against GAO   
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Federal Best Practices: AMC Agency-
Level Protest Timeline v. GAO
13
Federal Best Practices: FAA Bid 
Protest Timeline v. GAO
14
The Survey: Perspective of Top Procurement 
Law & Acquisition Management 
Leaders/Experts
• 51 individuals in 22 agencies asked to complete; 21 completed
• Key issues:
– What strategies or practices are used by agencies to prevent/minimize the 
impact of bid protests?
– To what extent are alternative dispute resolution procedures utilized as a 
means to prevent/minimize the impact of bid protests?
– What aspects of statute, policy, or regulation preclude the effective 
resolution of protests in a manner that minimizes their systemic impact?
• Likert scale: 
– 4—Always or With Great Frequency; 3—With Moderate Frequency; 2—In 
Exceptional Cases or With Rare Frequency; 1—Never
• Mean score of 2.00 commonly used as cut-off for groupings of 
data
• Survey dealt with leadership understanding or perception of 





Survey Respondents By Agency
17
SURVEY PARTS:
• PART I: Use of Prevention and Resolution 
Strategies; Use of ADR; Obstacles to 
Effective Prevention and Resolution
• PART II: Civilian v. Military Perspective
• PART III: Legal v. Acquisition Perspective
• PART IV: Comparative Pairings of Data on 
Problems and Solutions
18
Part I: Top 10 Defensive and 
Preventive Strategies Identified
19
Part II: Top 10 Least Cited Defensive 
Strategies and Practices
20
Part I: The View from Inside the 
Agencies:
Use of ADR to Resolve Bid Protests
21
Part I: Most Frequently Cited Obstacles to 
Effective Protest Prevention & Resolution
22
Part I: Least Frequently Cited Obstacles to 
Effective Protest Prevention & Resolution
23
PART II. Civilian v. Military Perspective: 
Top Prevention & Resolution Strategies
24
Part II. Civilian v. Military Perspective: 
Use of ADR Techniques
25
Part II. Civilian v. Military Perspective: 
Top Obstacles to Effective Prevention  & 
Resolution
26
Part II. Civilian v. Military Perspective: 
Least Frequent Obstacles to Effective 
Prevention  & Resolution
27
Part III. Legal v. Acquisition Perspective: 
Top Prevention & Resolution Strategies
28
Part III. Legal v. Acquisition Perspective: 
Least Used Prevention & Resolution 
Strategies
29
Part III. Legal v. Acquisition 
Perspective: 
Use of ADR Procedures
30
Part III. Legal v. Acquisition Perspective: 
Top Obstacles to Effective Prevention & 
Resolution
31
Part III. Legal v. Acquisition Perspective: 
Least Cited Obstacles to Effective 
Prevention and Resolution
32
PART IV.  Back to the Questions . . .
• Are Frivolous, Costly, Dilatory Bid Protests 
Besieging the Federal Acquisition System?
• Are Agencies Doing Everything They Can to 
Reduce Delays and Costs of Bid Protests? 
33
Top Defensive Strategies and Top 
Challenges for Effective Prevention and 
Resolution: Is There a Match?
34
Are Agency Strategies Tailored to 
Match Agencies’ Problems? 
Mostly, NO
• Frivolous protest as a problem: 2.83. Vigorous 
objections and sanctions:  1.67
• Poor debriefings: 2.35.  Quality mandatory 
debriefings: 3.3.
• Lack of properly trained acquisition workforce: 3.0.  
Proper training for workforce: 2.71.  
• Poor acquisition planning: 3.10.  Advance acquisition 
planning: 3.38
• Significant disparities on agency-level protest 
procedures (versus need), stay overrides (versus 
need), and assurance of clear and consistent 
evaluation criteria
35
How Serious Are Agencies About Fighting 
Delays to Procurement Programs?
36
Are Agencies Serious About Reducing 
Delays to Procurement Programs?  
Mostly, NO
• Stay overrides, express options, vigorous 
objections for dismissal, and refusals to follow 
GAO opinions are not frequent
• Obtaining and following a formal GAO opinion 
to recompete could mean 100 days of 
mandatory stay + at least 45 days of 
procurement administrative lead time (PALT) 
under FAR Part 5 for advertising + evaluation  
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How Serious Are Agencies About 
Reducing Costs from Bid Protests?
38
Are Agencies About Cutting Costs 
from Protests? Mostly, NO
• Unless agencies takes early corrective action 
or attempts some negotiation early on, they 
are unlikely to initiate other ADR procedures 
or refuse to follow costly GAO 
recommendations which may involve direct 
payments to protesters or indirect 
expenditures  
39
Top Defensive Strategies 
to Reduce “Strategic Protests”: 
Can Federal Procurement Be Protest-Proofed?
40
Insights into Protest-Proofing Agency 
Contracts
• Avoid winner-take-all strategies; make as 
many awards as possible to promote 
competition
• Conduct quality debriefings even if not 
required
41
How Can Clear Vision and Control





• Case for sanctions beyond truly frivolous not demonstrated; 
however, Rule 11-type sanctions should be established at the 
GAO
• Establish procedures to manage bid protests as business 
decisions in the procurement process
– Require written justifications/cost-benefit analysis for failure to seek 
stay overrides, conduct early corrective actions, use ADR, seek 
express options, refuse to follow GAO recommendation, etc., and 
approvals to proceed to formal litigation process and to follow GAO
– Create an FAA-type requirement for ADR as the first option, and 
formal litigation as the second option
• Vigorously object and seek sanctions for frivolous protests
• Provide quality debriefings to limit strategic protests
• Create and strengthen agency-level protests at all agencies
